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NOTE
Exceeding the Scope of an Easement:
“Expanded Use” Within a Single Cable
Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2017)

Matthew Neuman*

I. INTRODUCTION
Most people likely do not give a second thought to the manner in which
utilities reach their homes. Water, gas, electricity, cable, and internet service
must all make their way from source to faucet, stove, light fixture, television,
and entertainment device. A complex infrastructure system exists both below
ground in pipes and conduits and above ground on utility poles. In cities, utility
poles within generic utility easements are often adorned with a multitude of
wires – of varying dimensions, levels, types, and ownership – constantly delivering electricity and information.
At the core of this delivery system is the inconvenient fact that, in the
journey from point A to point B, the pipe or wire must cross a vast parcel network of differentiated ownership often composed of owners who either do not
want the intrusion or want to be fairly compensated for sharing their property
with the intrusion. And in the famous “bundle of rights” that is property, “the
right to exclude” gives the owner the prerogative to protest any invasion.1
It is in this context that easements, the necessary envelope in which those
critical utilities may pass across private ownership, come into existence primarily through negotiations or condemnation proceedings. In the end, the
holder of the easement compensates the servient estate and a strip of land becomes burdened by the easement. As technology develops and companies
evolve, a critical question emerges: to what extent may that easement holder
use its easement?
As developed in detail below, the facts of this case, despite intricacies
when examined in detail, present a scenario that is rather straightforward. A
utility, operating an expansive system of infrastructure, provides electrical service to rural areas. A change in operation requirements prompts the utility to
add to its easement a new piece of infrastructure – a fiber-optic cable – for
*

B.S. Environmental Geoscience, Texas A&M University, 2008; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2019; Associate Managing Editor, Missouri Law
Review, 2018-2019. I am grateful to Professor Freyermuth for his insight and guidance,
the Missouri Law Review staff for encouragement and edits, especially Aristotle Butler
and Emma Masse for their helpful suggestions early in the process, and my wife for
always offering support.
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
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internal communication purposes. This event complies wholly with the terms
of the easement. That piece of equipment may also be used in an additional
commercial manner that does not impose any further burden on the servient
estate than if the equipment is used only for internal communication purposes.
The utility seizes the opportunity. Not only does the utility defray costs for the
installation and upkeep of the necessary fiber-optic cable, but also the resulting
commercial telecommunications service benefits an expanded audience of users. From the perspective of the landowner, despite a philosophical query concerning the forfeiture of a theoretical “stick” from the “bundle of rights,” there
is no physical difference within the easement.
Part II of this Note explores the previous hypothetical in the facts of Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative,2 a class action lawsuit involving
the scope of easements under Missouri law. Part III provides a brief overview
of the legal background of the case and the concept of “expanded use” of easements. Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning in the case. Part V illustrates
how the outcome of the case is perhaps a stricter interpretation of “expanded
use” under Missouri law than previous cases and proposes that considering
“expanded use” in such a manner may be contrary to public policy.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative (“Sho-Me”) traces its roots back to
its formation in 1941 as an agriculture cooperative.3 In 1947, Sho-Me incorporated as a public utility and provided wholesale and retail electric service; in
1992, the corporation converted into a rural electric cooperative (“REC”).4 The
purpose of a REC is to supply, promote, and facilitate expansion of electric
energy in rural areas.5
2. 852 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2017).
3. SHO-ME POWER ELEC. COOP.,

2016 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2016),
http://shomepower.com/media/1071/2016annualreport.pdf.
4. Id.
5. MO. REV. STAT. § 394.030 (2016). A REC has power to
generate, manufacture, purchase, acquire, accumulate and transmit electric energy, and to distribute, sell, supply, and dispose of electric energy in rural areas
to its members, to governmental agencies and political subdivisions, and to
other persons not in excess of ten percent of the number of its members . . . . [It
has the power to ] construct, purchase, take, receive, lease as lessee, or otherwise acquire, and to own, hold, use, equip, maintain, and operate, and to sell,
assign, transfer, convey, exchange, lease as lessor, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of or encumber, electric transmission and distribution lines or systems . . . and any and all kinds and classes of real or personal property whatsoever, which shall be deemed necessary, convenient or appropriate to accomplish
the purpose for which the cooperative is organized[, and] . . . to exercise the
power of eminent domain in the manner provided by the laws of this state for
the exercise of that power by corporations constricting or operating electric
transmission and distribution lines or systems.
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Prior to 1992, Sho-Me obtained easements within thousands of parcels of
land in the southern portion of Missouri.6 The language of the easements gave
Sho-Me the privilege to construct and operate electric transmission lines across
these tracts.7 The grants of these easements varied, but the district court determined the easements of interest in this dispute to be those that were either easements for an electric transmission line only, grants for an electric transmission
line with unspecified appurtenances, or appurtenances including specific references to communications equipment.8
Sho-Me initially communicated with distant power substations along its
network of electric transmission lines using microwave radio frequencies, but
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) directed in 1995 that utilities could no longer continue this practice.9 As a result, Sho-Me installed fiberoptic cables10 adjacent to its electrical cables for internal communications.11
Sho-Me also established a subsidiary, Sho-Me Technologies, LLC,12 to sell
commercial telecommunications to the public utilizing the excess capacity on
its fiber-optic cable.13
MO. REV. STAT. § 394.080.1(4), (7), (11) (2016) (amended 2018).
6. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798.
7. Id.
8. Id. The district court grouped the easements into three categories; Category
1A, Category 2A, and Category 3A, were at issue upon appeal. Category 1A consisted
of “[e]asements for electric transmission line only or for electric transmission line with
unspecified appurtenances.” Id. Category 1B included “[e]asements for electric transmission lines and appurtenances which include specific references to communications
equipment,” and Category 1C contained “[c]ourt orders condemning easements limited
to electric transmission lines and generic appurtenances or specifying related communications equipment.” Id. Category 1A had 1972 easements, Category 1B had 653
easements, and Category 1C had 22 easements. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop.,
10 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1010 (W.D. Mo. 2014). Summary judgment was granted in favor
of Sho-Me on other categories of easements referencing external telephone/communication purposes. Id. at 1017–19, 1028.
9. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798. The frequencies that utilities used previously were
sold to cellular telephone providers. Barfield, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 1004.
10. A fiber-optic cable consists of glass fibers; electric signals are converted to
light and transmitted through these fibers at speeds exceeding those provided by DSL
or cable modem. Types of Broadband Connections, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/types-broadband-connections (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
11. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798.
12. Future references to “Sho-Me” include Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative
and its subsidiary, Sho-Me Technologies, L.L.C. See generally SHO-ME POWER ELEC.
COOP., supra note 3, at 1 (“Sho-Me Technologies, L.L.C. . . . is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative.”).
13. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798; see SHO-ME POWER ELEC. COOP., supra note 3, at 1
(“What began as an upgrade to the extensive internal communications network has now
grown to encompass over 8,000 miles of fiber optic connectivity.”). Per the limited
powers enumerated in the REC statute, this REC was required to form the subsidiary
to conduct the telecommunications business. MO. REV. STAT. § 394.080 (amended
2018).
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The landholders subject to the Sho-Me easements filed a class action lawsuit against Sho-Me, alleging that the easements’ language did not allow the
use of the fiber-optic cable for commercial telecommunication.14 Of the categories of easements recognized as lacking a reference to commercial telecommunications, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the landowners and held Sho-Me liable for trespass and unjust enrichment.15 A jury
trial, pursued solely on the unjust enrichment claim, resulted in an award for
the landowners in excess of $79,000,000.16 Sho-Me appealed.17 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ultimately held that Sho-Me’s use of
the easements for public-serving telecommunication purposes exceeded the
scope of its easements, so the trespass liability was affirmed; however, unjust
enrichment was not an available remedy for a utility exceeding the scope of its
easement.18

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section A of this Part provides a summary of the legal framework regarding easements in general. Section B then transitions into a discussion of how
Missouri courts have treated expanded use – the use beyond the scope of an
easement.19 Expanded use is analyzed in the development of case law, in a
2006 statutory provision, and in the sparse application of that statute. Section
C delves into an example where a Missouri court permissively allowed a more
expansive use of an easement and a second example of when it did not. Finally,
Section D examines the consequences of trespass in the context of the holder
of an easement misusing his or her rights.

14. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798. The case found its way to federal district court by
way of diversity jurisdiction because one of the named plaintiffs was from Florida.
Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., No, 11–4321–NKL, 2012 WL 2368517, at *1
n.1 (W.D. Mo. June 21, 2012). The instant case found the district court did not abuse
its discretion in certifying the class of landowners. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 806.
15. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 799.
16. Id. The jury verdict equaled $1.88 per foot per year for the ten-year period in
which Sho-Me utilized the fiber-optic cable for commercial-telecommunication purposes. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 309 F.R.D. 491, 496 n.4 (W.D. Mo.
2015). The jury was instructed to find the fair market rental value of Sho-Me’s use of
the fiber-optic cables for the telecommunication use based off the ten-year period from
the first unauthorized use up to the time of trial. Id. at 496. In terms of unjust enrichment, this was the amount in which Sho-Me was unjustly benefitted by not obtaining
proper easements from the landowners. See id. at 502.
17. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 798.
18. Id. at 804–05.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 73–74 (further defining the expanded use
easement).
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A. A Primer on Missouri Easement Law
Any legal discussion of an easement necessarily begins with the rights
associated with the creation of that easement and its resulting characteristics.
An easement is “a right only to one or more particular uses” of land.20 Easements are of two varieties: appurtenant or in gross.21 In the case of an easement
appurtenant, the servient estate gives a benefit arising from the use of real property to the dominant estate receiving that advantage.22 In other words, the dominant estate is the piece of land that is benefitted by the easement, and the servient estate is the piece of land that is burdened by the easement. Alternatively,
an easement in gross exists without a dominant tenement; the right to use a
piece of land is not dependent on the possession of any other tract of land.23
An easement in gross is simply an easement that benefits another party. Easements in gross of a commercial nature are assignable or capable of transfer.24
The traditional affirmative easement, an easement allowing some particular use of land, is created by grant.25 The easement’s conveyance, or granting
language, is crucial in defining the scope for which the easement may be used.26
The interpretation of an easement created by a deed is a question of law, treated
similar to the interpretation of any contract, and the intention of the grantor
must be discerned from the instrument.27 That intention should come from the
entirety of the instrument in accord with the common-sense meaning of the
language present in the document.28 If there is any uncertainty about an easement’s scope, “[a]ny doubt . . . should be resolved in favor of the servient
owner’s free and untrammeled use of the land.”29

20. Farmers Drainage Dist. v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 255 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo. 1953).
21. Burg v. Dampier, 346 S.W.3d 343, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011).
22. Id. An easement appurtenant essentially involves two tracts of land. See id.

One tract of land is benefitted to the detriment of the other. Id. For example, if Landowner A conveys a strip of land for ingress/egress over his tract as an easement appurtenant to a neighboring tract owned by Landowner B, that easement will benefit whoever owns the neighboring tract – the easement runs with the land. So, when Landowner B deeds the tract to Landowner C, Landowner C now has the right of ingress/egress over the easement and Landowner B has the right no more.
23. Id. An easement in gross benefits a party irrespective of his ownership of any
tract of land. Id. For example, utility, railroad, and pipeline easements are common
easements in gross. See, e.g., Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692
S.W.2d 825, 827 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). The benefit is not to a specific tract of land but
to a person or company.
24. Kan. City Area Transp. Auth. v. Ashley, 485 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972).
25. R. WILSON FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 520, 529 (3d ed.
2011).
26. See, e.g., Maasen v. Shaw, 133 S.W.3d 514, 518–19 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
27. Erwin v. City of Palmyra, 119 S.W.3d 582, 584–85 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
28. Blackburn v. Habitat Dev. Co., 57 S.W.3d 378, 386 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
29. Maasen, 133 S.W.3d at 519.
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Although an easement is typically created by formal grant, that is not the
only manner in which an easement may come into existence.30 In some cases,
a generic grant has no use restrictions; the result of such a grant is an easement
“of unlimited reasonable use.”31 An easement by prescription is a separate
means of establishing an easement, which occurs when “use . . . is shown to
have been continuous, uninterrupted, visible and adverse for a period of ten
years.”32 Easements may also be created through condemnation by certain entities for specific public uses when an agreement on compensation cannot be
reached.33
An easement may be either exclusive or nonexclusive.34 These terms denote the ability of the servient owner to use the easement.35 In an exclusive
easement, the servient owner – the owner of the burdened estate – is excluded
“from participation in the rights granted to the dominant owner,” but a nonexclusive easement allows the servient owner “the privilege of sharing the benefits conferred by the easement.”36 Put another way, an exclusive easement is
one in which the owner of the easement holds all of the rights to use the easement to the exclusion of the owner of the land burdened by the easement and
all others without the authorization of the easement holder. But, if an easement
is non-exclusive, the owner of the land burdened by the easement may still
grant the use of the easement to others.

B. The Development of “Expanded Use”
The remainder of this Part discusses how Missouri courts have addressed
the use of easements that are supposedly inconsistent with the terms of their
grant because of an expanded use. In St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & Southern
Railway Company v. Cape Girardeau Bell Telephone Company, an early opinion, Cape Girardeau & Chester Railway Company (“Railroad A”) acquired an
easement through condemnation across the existing easement of the St. Louis,

30. Jacobs v. Brewster, 190 S.W.2d 894, 896 (Mo. 1945).
31. Maasen, 133 S.W.3d at 518. In Maasen, the conveyance was merely for “[a]

non-exclusive easement [fifty] feet wide.” Id. (alteration in original).
32. Guerin v. Yocum, 506 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
33. See MO. REV. STAT. § 523.010 (2016); Kamo Elec. Coop., v. Baker, 287
S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. 1956). This discussion does not cover all manners of creation
of an easement but only those necessary for the analysis in the remainder of this Note.
There are other manners of creating easements. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Grossman,
351 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Mo. 1961) (agreement); Litchfield v. Boogher, 142 S.W. 302,
303 (Mo. 1911) (reservation); King v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 708 S.W.2d 194, 196–
97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (necessity); Allee v. Kirk, 602 S.W.2d 922, 924–925 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (estoppel); Causey v. Williams, 398 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)
(implication).
34. See Maasen, 133 S.W.3d at 518.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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Iron Mountain, & Southern Railway Company (“Railroad B”).37 Railroad A
then contracted with Cape Girardeau Bell Telephone Company, allowing the
telephone company the right to construct and operate a system of telephone
lines within the easement.38 The purpose of installing the lines was to serve
the railroad, but the telephone company planned to use the lines to serve the
public as well.39 Railroad B brought suit to enjoin the construction of the line
across its right of way absent consent or compensation and alleged the use of
the telephone lines for public service “amount[ed] to an additional burden on
the plaintiff’s right of way.”40 Although the pertinent analysis needed to focus
on the rights of an existing easement holder, the St. Louis Court of Appeals
nevertheless set out an explanation of the rights between a fee owner41 and an
easement holder in dicta that would be relied upon verbatim in future decisions.42 The court explained:
[W]here the adjacent owner of the fee has asserted a right, it is declared
that, in so far as the telegraph company serves the purpose of the railroad, its occupancy of the right of way easement is not an additional
servitude or burden upon the fee of which he may complain. The right
of the adjacent fee owner is precluded on the theory that such use is a
legitimate development for railroad purposes essentially contemplated
in the grant of the easement and for which he received compensation at
the time. Nevertheless, in so far as the telegraph or telephone company
thus rightfully occupying the right of way serves the general public as
a commercial enterprise, distinct from the avocation of the railroad, it
constitutes a use of the right of way easement other than for railroad
purposes, and it is therefore a servitude not contemplated in the original
grant and a burden upon the fee of which the adjacent owner may rightfully complain. It is obvious the transmission of intelligence by means
37.
38.
39.
40.

114 S.W. 586, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 586–87. The factual setup of the case is unique because it is the easement
holder, not the landowner, complaining of an additional burden. Id. at 587. Although
the case does not discuss consent from the landowner, this is likely because of the
unique position of the railroad holding its right of way: “the law excludes the owner of
the fee and all other persons from any occupancy of the surface within the confines of
the right of way at all places other than at crossings, public or private, or other consistent
uses accorded by the statute.” Id. at 589.
41. The owner of the fee, or fee simple, is what a person would normally associate
with ownership of land. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property §12, Westlaw (database updated
Aug. 2018). Black’s Law Dictionary defines fee simple as “[a]n interest in land, that
being the broadest property interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder
dies without heirs.” Fee Simple, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
42. Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 588; see, e.g., Barfield v. Show-Me Power
Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 2017); Kan. City v. Ashley, 406 S.W.2d 584,
592 (Mo. 1966); Eureka Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. S. Real Estate & Fin. Co., 200 S.W.2d
328, 332 (Mo. 1947).
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of electricity to all the world who may be willing to pay for the service
is not a railroad use, and such service is certainly not contemplated
within the grant of the railroad right of way, for it is entirely disassociated therefrom.43

Because the complaining Railroad B possessed only an easement, the
court, while acknowledging that the fee owner’s interest was not at issue, held
“that the mere commercial use of the telephone under the circumstances mentioned” by Railroad A did not constitute any additional burden on Railroad B.44
Cape Girardeau, in its explanation of a fee owner’s “high proprietary
rights” to complain of “a servitude not contemplated in the original grant” relied, in part, on three main sources:45 Western Union Telegraph Company v.
Rich,46 American Telegraph and Telephone Company v. Pearce,47 and a treatise on telegraph and telephone companies.48 Rich involved a landowner suing
a telegraph company for cutting down trees on a railroad right-of-way, but evidence that the telegraph company was acting in concert with the railroad company was excluded.49 The case acknowledged that a railroad is allowed to have
additional infrastructure beyond its tracks that “reasonably tends to facilitate
its business of transporting freight and passengers, and by such use in no manner transcends the purposes and extent of the easement.”50 Furthermore, the
court in Rich found that the telegraph company was not liable for damages
because those damages arose from an undertaking that the railroad could have

43. Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 588.
44. Id. at 590.
45. Id. at 588–89. A legal encyclopedia is referenced as well. Id. at 589. The

encyclopedia entry explains:
A telegraph or telephone line upon the right of way of a railroad company is,
generally, an additional burden, for which the original owner of the land, if he
retains the fee, is entitled to compensation; but where the line is constructed by
the railroad company in good faith, for its own use, and is reasonably necessary
for its operation, there is no additional servitude, but merely a legitimate development of the easement originally acquired.

THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAW 1011–12 (James Cockcroft et
al. eds., 2d ed. 1904), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo1.ark:/13960/t2c82vn9g. The citations for the entry overlap
with other sources cited by the Cape Girardeau Bell court. Compare id. at 1012, with
Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 589.
46. 19 Kan. 517 (1878).
47. 18 A. 910 (Md. 1889) (consolidating ten cases, including American Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Pearce).
48. S. WALTER JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
COMPANIES § 147 (1906).
49. Rich, 19 Kan. at 519–20.
50. Id. at 520.
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exercised without liability.51 Essentially, Rich stands for the proposition that
“every additional burden cast upon the land outside of the purpose and scope
of the original easement, no matter in whose behalf, gives to the land[owner] a
new claim for compensation,” but its holding allows for physical modification
within a railroad easement where necessary for a telegraph “so convenient if
not indispensable” to the railroad’s operation.52
In Pearce, a railroad company granted a telegraph and telephone company the right to erect and operate telephone and telegraph lines along its right
of way.53 The telephone and telegraph company constructed a new, larger system of poles, arms, and lines for its own business.54 The resulting infrastructure
was of such significant character that the court described it as “not being put
up in order to subserve or promote the business purposes of [the] railroad, and
in no sense of the term can it be regarded as necessary, or reasonably necessary.”55 The court determined that whether a new structure created an additional servitude, or a burden beyond the scope of the original easement, was a
question of fact and found that the new line was an additional servitude.56 In
analyzing the motive of the defendant telephone company in its construction
of the new line, the court found that “the main object in constructing it . . .
[was] not reasonably necessary for the purposes of the railroad.”57
The final basis for the passage from Cape Girardeau comes from an early
treatise concerning telegraph and telephone companies.58 The relevant sections
in the treatise reference Rich and Pearce.59 Section 147 of the treatise further
explains that a “telegraph line may have been originally constructed by the
railroad company for its own use but upon a transfer, of such a line by the
railroad company to a telegraph company, the owner of the fee may claim compensation.”60 However, this statement is derived from a case in which a railroad assigned the ownership of its telegraph poles and lines to a telegraph company.61 That company in turn erected a new, larger line offset from the original
line.62 Again, the court found that the new construction of the line was not
51. Id. at 520–21 (“Whatever it could do and would have done for its own use and
benefit, and was so done, was, so far as the land–owner is concerned, damnum absque
injuria, no matter who bore the expense; or perhaps more correctly, it was damages
already paid for.”).
52. Id.
53. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, 18 A. 910, 911 (Md. 1889) (consolidating
ten cases, including American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pearce).
54. Id. at 915.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 913, 916.
57. Id. at 913.
58. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586, 587–
89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908).
59. JONES, supra note 48, § 147.
60. Id.
61. Hodges v. W. Union Tel. Co., 45 S.E. 572, 573 (N.C. 1903).
62. Id. at 574.
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“reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the easement granted to the railroad
company.”63
Eureka Real Estate & Investment Company v. Southern Real Estate &
Financial Company extends the logic applied in Cape Girardeau.64 In Eureka,
a railroad company with an easement across a fee holder’s land licensed an
electric company to construct poles and lines on its right of way as part of operating the company’s streetcars.65 After partial abandonment of the tracks,
the power line – used to supply power to streetcars on other sections of the
track – was still a “necessary incidental purpose” of the easement.66 However,
the construction of an additional line over the existing right of way – a line with
“no connection whatever with the electric lines or purposes of the street railway
except that some of its poles are used as guys for the streetcar company’s poles”
– was held to be “an additional servitude and an interest in the land.”67 As in
Cape Girardeau, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that the owner of an
easement could not impose an additional burden upon the servient estate.68
Early in the twenty-first century, a new Missouri statute, largely arising
out of a legislative response to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Kelo v. City of New London,69 sought to rein in the ability of private entities to
engage in “expanded use” of easements.70 In 2006, the Missouri legislature
created a statutory provision confining newly created easements of utilities to
be “fixed and determined by the particular use for which the property was acquired.”71 Under section 523.283, for a utility to make “expanded use of the
property,” the utility must either condemn the property or make new contractual arrangements with the landowner.72
“Expanded use” is defined as “[t]he exclusion of use by the current owner
of the burdened property from an area greater than the area originally described” or “[a]n increased footprint or burden greater than the footprint or
burden originally described in the instrument of conveyance or condemnation

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 576.
200 S.W.2d 328, 332 (Mo. 1947).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id. at 332.
Id.
545 U.S. 469 (2005). In Kelo, a private nonprofit, on behalf of the City of
New London, Connecticut, sought to condemn, through eminent domain, the property
of holdouts within an area of land planned for economic development. Id. at 473–75.
The primary issue in the case was whether the economic development plan served a
“public purpose,” a requirement under the Fifth Amendment for any taking. Id. at 472,
478–80. The Court held that economic development could be a public purpose and that
the property could be taken. Id. at 485–86.
70. Dale A. Whitman, Eminent Domain Reform in Missouri: A Legislative Memoir, 71 MO. L. REV. 721, 723, 751 (2006).
71. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.1 (2016).
72. Id.
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petition.”73 The statute further clarifies that “increased footprint or burden”
equates to “a different type of use or a use presenting an unreasonably burdensome impact on the property, the landowner, or the activities being conducted
on the property by the landowner.”74 Case law interpreting the statute is limited.
Carroll Electric Cooperative Company v. Lambert applies section
523.283 in the context of a proposed electric transmission line.75 In Carroll
Electric, a REC sought to condemn a right of way for an electric distribution
line.76 In the REC’s offer letter to the landowners, it proposed easement language that specified the ability “to license, permit, or otherwise agree to the
joint use or occupancy of the line or system by any other person, association or
corporation for electrification or communication purposes.”77 At trial, the
court dismissed the condemnation petition partly because the REC included the
language pertaining to communication use; the court held that use beyond the
authority of the REC in its eminent domain power.78 In the REC’s appeal of
the trial court’s dismissal of the condemnation petition, the landowners argued
that the use of the easement by other parties for communication purposes exceeded the electric cooperative’s authority.79 However, an engineer working
on the project testified that the company was only condemning for electric purposes and that third-party telecommunication companies would have to obtain
their own easement.80

73. Id. § 523.283.2. In the introduced version of HB 1944, “expanded use” was
defined as:
(1) The exclusion of use by the current owner of the burdened property from an
area greater than the area originally contemplated at the time of acquisition by
the condemning authority; (2) An increased footprint greater than the footprint
originally contemplated at the time of acquisition by the condemning authority;
(3) An attempt to confer property rights of any nature whatsoever to another
entity other than a successor-in-interest; or (4) Any altered use which substantially changes the ability of the current owner of the burdened property to operate farm machinery in the area of the property interest originally acquired by
the condemning authority.

H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (as introduced),
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills061/hlrbillspdf/4100L.04I.pdf; see also Whitman, supra note 70, at 751. “Increased footprint” was defined as “a different use or a
use that has greater impact on the property, the landowner, or the activities being conducted on the property by the landowner.” H.B. 1944; see also Whitman, supra note
70, at 753.
74. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016) (emphasis added).
75. 403 S.W.3d 637, 644–45 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
76. Id. at 639.
77. Id. at 641.
78. Id. at 639.
79. Id. at 644.
80. Id. at 642.
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The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District agreed with the
REC that lines for internal communication were essential to the operation of
the electric system and that the power of eminent domain extended to that use.81
Citing section 523.283, the REC conceded, and the court agreed, that “any use
other than for electricity is an expanded use of the proposed easements which
would be prohibited . . . without a new condemnation action or a negotiated
expansion of the existing easement.”82 Based on the evidence in the record,
there was no indication that the easements would be used for anything other
than electric service.83 However, the REC’s power of eminent domain did extend to essential provisions, including communications between substations using a fiber-optic cable.84

C. A Different Type of Use for Utility Easements Prior to Section
523.283
The use of an easement need not remain stagnant over time, but there are
restrictions on how far from the original use the future use may be. Henley v.
Continental Cablevision of St. Louis County, Inc.85 demonstrates how the court
can interpret older easements to allow for changes in technology over time. In
Henley, an easement granted in the early 1920s created the right to use a specified area across tracts in a subdivision for the purpose of constructing and
maintaining electric, telephone, and telegraphic systems.86 Then, in the 1980s,
a cable television company received a license from the easement holder to install cabling “for the purpose of transmitting television programs.”87 The landowners argued that the cable constituted an extra burden.88 The Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District disagreed.89
By interpreting the original easement with the broader purpose of “bringing electrical power and communication into the homes of the subdivision,”
the court allowed for “scientific and technological progress.”90 The court
stated the issue was one of first impression in the state and cited opinions from

81. See id. at 646. Simply put, eminent domain refers to the power of government
to take private land for public use following reasonable compensation. Eminent Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Certain private entities, including
RECs, may also be granted the power of eminent domain by statute. MO. REV. STAT.
§ 523.262.1–2 (2016).
82. Carroll Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Lambert, 403 S.W.3d 637, 645 (Mo. Ct. App.
2012).
83. Id. at 646.
84. Id. at 644.
85. 692 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
86. Id. at 827.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 828.
89. See id. at 829.
90. Id.
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other jurisdictions; those other jurisdictions reasoned that adding a coaxial cable, as opposed to a telephone wire, imposed no greater burden.91 The court
referenced “the general rule that easements in gross for commercial purposes
are particularly alienable and transferable.”92 The court also found that “it is
in the public interest to use the facilities already installed for the purpose of
carrying out this [broadly defined original] intention to provide the most economically feasible and least environmentally damaging vehicle for installing
cable systems.”93
In determining the rights of the easement holder, the characteristics of the
easement play a pivotal role. For example, courts are less likely to find that an
expanded use of a prescriptive easement is reasonable and valid. In Ogg v.
Mediacom,94 a REC held a prescriptive easement95 across the landowner’s
property and authorized – without the landowner’s consent – a license to utilize
the REC’s existing poles to hang a fiber-optic cable six feet lower than the
electric cables, which were installed eighteen-to-twenty feet high.96 In an action for trespass by landowners against the cable company, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the cable company after focusing on the
issue of whether the additional fiber-optic cable “would create an unreasonable
additional burden or servitude” on the landowner.97 The Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Western District determined that this was not the proper analysis because the prescriptive easement held by the REC effectively limited the
rights of any license that it may grant.98
The court reasoned that “the rights of the holder of an easement acquired
by prescription are defined solely by the character and extent of the use made
thereof during the prescriptive period.”99 The court specified that “no different
or greater use could lawfully be made of that portion of the [landowner’s] property by [the REC] or [the cable television company], neither of whom had the
legal right to unilaterally expand, in character or extent, the prior prescriptive
use.”100 This definitive statement does not delve into the difference in character between the use of cables by the REC and the use of cables by the cable
television company, but rather it seems to rely more on the proposition that
“prescriptive easements ‘are no favorites of the law’” and are thus strictly confined.101
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 828–29.
Id. at 829.
Id.
142 S.W.3d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
See discussion supra Section III.A.
Ogg, 142 S.W.3d at 804–05.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 809 (emphasis added).
Id. at 810.
See id. at 809 (quoting Cook v. Bolin, 296 S.W.2d 181, 187 (Mo. Ct. App.
1956)). In holding that the REC could not license the cable company rights that it did
not have, a footnote also acknowledges that “to the extent the purported license . . .
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D. Trespass and Remedies
The tort of trespass is commonly recognized as every unauthorized, and
therefore unlawful, entry on to the property of another.102 In the context of
easements, a trespass occurs when the user “exceeds his rights, either in manner
or extent of use.”103 A change in the degree of use is allowed, but a change in
the quality of an easement – “a substantial new burden on the servient estate”
– will be a trespass.104 The issue boils down to whether or not there is a change
in the character of the easement. The landowner has the right to control
changes in the character of any easement.105
A trespasser is liable for all damages resulting from the trespass.106 The
distinction between permanent and temporary injury is essential to determining
damages. Traditionally, these measures were based on actual physical damages; an early case sets out the Missouri rule, stating, “Where the destruction
of the thing includes but a temporary injury to the land, . . . the true measure of
damages is the cost of replacing it and the rental value of the land until it is
replaced.”107 However, “where the destruction of the thing inflicts more than
a temporary injury to the land, or the replacement would be impossible or tedious and uncertain both in cost and result, the criterion is the damage inflicted
plac[ed] an unreasonable additional burden or servitude upon the . . . fee simple title, it
was also unlawful under . . . Eureka.” Id. at 810 n.13.
102. See Crook v. Sheehan Enters., 740 S.W.2d 333, 335 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[A
t]respass is the unauthorized entry by a person upon the land of another, regardless of
the degree of force used, even if no damage is done, or the injury is slight.”).
103. Macios v. Hensley, 886 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Id.
105. See Kavanaugh v. St. Louis Traction Co., 105 S.W. 278, 282 (Mo. Ct. App.
1907) (“The owner of a dominant estate can neither increase the servitude imposed on
the servient tenement or change its character. This rule is a recognition of the right of
the owner of property to control its use, and is pushed to the extent of holding that,
although the proposed change in the character of the servitude would prove beneficial,
rather than injurious, to the servient estate, it is for the owner of the latter to say whether
or not he will tolerate the change.”). Kavanaugh approved of the outcome of a case
where a pipe and subsequent fill was not allowed in an easement granted to carry water
through an open ditch. See id.; cf. Maasen v. Shaw, 133 S.W.3d 514, 520 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2004) (parking vehicles is a change in the quality of use in an easement for ingress
and egress); Macios, 886 S.W.2d at 752 (docking boats is a change in the quality of use
in an easement for ingress and egress). The landowner’s control is restricted to controlling how the servient owner may change the easement; the landowner may not unilaterally change the character of the easement outside what was granted. See Gerber v.
Appel, 173 S.W.2d 90, 93–94 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943) (“There is certainly nothing in [the
easement] that allows the owner of a fee to change a walkway into a vehicular roadway.”).
106. See Smith v. Woodard, 15 S.W.3d 768, 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (“[W]ith
trespass no actual damages must be proven; the claimant is entitled to at least nominal
damages.”).
107. Adam v. Chi., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 122 S.W. 1136, 1136–37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1909).
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on the market value of the land.”108 If a landowner has been deprived of the
land in the absence of other damage, fair rental value is an appropriate remedy.109 If no actual damage results from a trespass, a court may still award
nominal damages.110 Punitive damages are available “where the use is in reckless disregard of or indifference to the rights of a property owner.”111 Any
intentional trespass satisfies submission of punitive damages to a jury.112 A
good-faith belief that one’s actions are legal removes punitive damages from
consideration.113
In Sterbenz v. Kansas City Power and Light Company,114 the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Western District analyzed the consequences of trespass by an entity endowed with eminent domain.115 Of the available remedies,
the court explained that a “landowner ‘may proceed by way of injunction to
restrain the installation; or he may sue in ejectment; or he may avail himself of
[section 523.090]; or he may maintain a common law action for damages.’”116
If a suit for damages is chosen, the method for determining damages varies
based on whether the trespass injury is temporary or permanent, as previously
discussed.117 With a new permanent utility across a property, actual damages
would be the same as condemnation.118 This would be calculated as the loss
in the fair market value of the entire piece of property before and after the taking.119 The court posited that a “‘trespassing’ condemning authority would be
required to bring a separate eminent domain action . . . to secure ‘title’ to the

108. Id. at 1137.
109. Kitterman v. Simrall, 924 S.W.2d 872, 879 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996); see also S.

Mo. Dist. Council of Assemblies of God v. Hendricks, 807 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1991).
110. Woodard, 15 S.W.3d at 773 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); see also Crooks v. Sheehan
Enters., 740 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
111. Ogg v. Mediacom, L.L.C., 142 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
112. Wright v. Edison, 619 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
113. Tamko Asphalt Prods., Inc. v. Arch Assocs., 830 S.W.2d 434, 441 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1992).
114. 333 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).
115. Id. at 7–10.
116. Id. at 7–8 (alteration in original) (quoting Beetschen v. Shell Pipe Line Corp,
248 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952)); see discussion supra Section III.D. An injunction would halt the installation. An action in ejectment would be for the recovery
of possession for the land in question. See MO. REV. STAT. § 524.010 (2016). Section
523.090 provides that any person may have damages ascertained in condemnation proceedings when their property has been damaged for public use. MO. REV. STAT. §
523.090 (2016).
117. Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 8. See supra notes 106–13 and accompanying text.
118. Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 9.
119. Id. Condemnation proceedings are set out in chapter 523. MO. REV. STAT. §
523 (2016).
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appropriated tract, though presumably, no further compensation for the ‘taking’ would be awarded given the equivalently measured permanent trespass
damages.”120
Unjust enrichment, an alternate theory of recovery, refers to “the effect of
the failure of a party to make restitution where it ought to be made.”121 Recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment requires a benefit to the defendant
from the plaintiff and retention of that benefit by the defendant; above all else,
the defendant’s retention of the benefit must be inequitable.122 The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment allows restitution for the
conferment of a benefit stemming from a trespass and provides that damages
in the form of rental value may be appropriate under certain circumstances
when the defendant uses the property without authorization and receives
“saved expenditure.”123

IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Eighth Circuit held that Sho-Me’s use of the easements for publicserving telecommunication purposes exceeded the scope of its easements and
constituted a trespass; however, the court found that unjust enrichment was not
an available remedy.124 The court reached its conclusion by first analyzing
whether the easements authorized Sho-Me to utilize the fiber-optic cables for
commercial telecommunications.125 Finding that the easements did not allow
this use, the court next analyzed whether exceeding the rights of those easements constituted a trespass.126 Confirming the trespass liability, the court then
looked to whether unjust-enrichment liability was a proper remedy against an
entity capable of exercising eminent domain and held that it was not.127
Because the parties agreed on Sho-Me’s authorization to install and use
the fiber-optic cables for internal communication associated with supplying
electricity, the court began with an analysis of whether the easements gave Sho-

120.
121.
122.
123.

Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 9.
Graves v. Berkowitz, 15 S.W.3d 59, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
Green Quarries, Inc. v. Raasch, 676 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 40 (AM.
LAW INST. 2011) (finding saved expenditure often comes about because “the defendant
has made a valuable use of the defendant’s property without paying for it.”). The Restatement’s illustration on this point involves a developer selling a piece of land and
then, while the purchaser owns the land but delays building on it, using the land to store
and subsequently dispose of dirt from grading projects elsewhere in the development.
Id. There is no injury or interference with the landowner, but rental value of the land
during the time the dirt was present is the proper measure of restitution. Id.
124. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 804–05 (8th Cir. 2017).
125. Id. at 799–802.
126. Id. at 802–04.
127. Id. at 804–05.
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Me the right to utilize the fiber-optic cables for commercial telecommunications.128 After looking to section 523.283 and prior Missouri case law as a
basis for interpreting “expanded use,” the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
easement did not allow use of the cable for commercial telecommunications.129
The court reached this position after analyzing Carroll Electric to extract the
meaning of expanded use in Missouri in similar circumstances of a REC attempting to place fiber-optic cables for commercial telecommunication in an
easement for an electric line.130 Carroll Electric, relying on the statutory definition of “expanded use” in section 523.283, held that communication lines
within an easement authorizing electric power transmission lines do not allow
for any non-electric uses.131
In the instant decision, the court concluded that section 523.283 made no
change to existing law for understanding expanded use – a crucial fact because
the statute applies only to post-2006 easements.132 The court then relied on
Eureka, Ogg, and Cape Girardeau for the proposition that the easement would
not authorize commercial telecommunication use.133 Dicta from Cape
Girardeau – that a use “distinct from the avocation of” or “entirely disassociated” with the original grant of the easement is not permitted – served as the
determinative rationale of the court.134
The court summarily rejected Sho-Me’s remaining arguments of “same
general character” and “unlimited reasonable use” to justify the use beyond
what is specifically granted in the easement.135 Sho-Me argued that the use of
the easement could change to a use of a similar character, but the court held
that only an increased degree of use of the easement was authorized and not a
new, unauthorized use – even one that was physically similar.136 Sho-Me also
argued that the original terms of the easements were general enough that ShoMe could make unlimited reasonable use of the easements.137 However, the
court held that the use of the easements must still be limited to the original
purpose of their creation.138
In concluding its discussion on expanded use, the court addressed Henley
in response to Sho-Me’s argument that the easement should not be restricted to

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 799–800.
Id. at 800–03.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 801–02 (citing Eureka Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. S. Real Estate & Fin.
Co, 200 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. 1947); Ogg v. Mediacom, 142 S.3d 801 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004);
St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586 (Mo. Ct. App.
1908)).
134. Id. at 801.
135. Id. at 802.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 802–03.
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its “original purpose.”139 The court explained that Henley, which held that a
coaxial cable for television purposes was within the scope of an easement
granted for telephone and electricity, was inapposite to the easements at issue
in Sho-Me’s case.140 The court looked at the assumed intention of the grantors
of the easement in Henley and the framing of the old easement as broadly covering communications to note that the new coaxial cable was still within the
original grant.141 Finding no intention of Sho-Me’s easement to authorize commercial telecommunication use, the court ultimately concluded that the easements in Carroll Electric, rather than Henley, were more analogous to ShoMe’s easements.142
The court next affirmed Sho-Me’s trespass liability.143 Although Sho-Me
maintained a position that “invisible light pulses” could not constitute a trespass, the court held that Sho-Me’s unauthorized use itself constituted trespass.144 Sho-Me referenced, to no avail, an Arkansas case with nearly identical
circumstances where the Eighth Circuit found that Arkansas law did not recognize a trespass claim for mere light signals, but the court found that decision
inapplicable to Missouri law.145 The court held that the unauthorized use was
enough to hold Sho-Me subject to trespass liability, regardless of whether there
was a further physical invasion of land.146
After affirming Sho-Me’s liability for trespass, the court next discussed
the trial court’s damages award, which was granted on a theory of unjust enrichment.147 Using the Sterbenz case as a model for remedies available in a
case where an entity with eminent domain power ignores that power and trespasses, the Eighth Circuit found a plaintiff limited to only four remedies.148
Sterbenz provided for “an election of remedies”: (1) an injunction to stop installation, (2) an ejectment, (3) a proceeding for condemnation, or (4) “a common law action for damages.”149 Finding no possibility for an alternative remedy to a list specifying an election of remedies and recognizing that the landowners could point to no Missouri cases allowing unjust enrichment under similar circumstances, the court held that unjust enrichment was not a proper remedy for an unauthorized use of land.150 This proposition was supported by an
early Missouri case that held a suit for use and occupation without a landlord-

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 803.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 803–04.
Id.
Id. at 804.
Id. (citing Sterbenz v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 333 S.W.3d 1, 7–8 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2010)).
149. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Sterbenz, 33 S.W.3d at 7–8).
150. Id.
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tenant relationship was not proper.151 The existence of section 523.283, with
references only to an action for trespass or expanded use, further bolstered the
court’s holding that unjust enrichment was not a proper remedy in this case.152

V. COMMENT
The court held that Sho-Me’s use of the fiber-optic cable for commercial
telecommunications made it liable under Missouri law for trespass based on
the theory of “expanded use” presented in section 523.283, which the court
determined was identical to earlier law.153 The statute’s definition of “increased footprint or burden” to “mean a different type of use or a use presenting
an unreasonably burdensome impact of the property” is instructive, although
the meaning of “a different type of use” is not explicit.154 This Part first argues
that, based on Missouri cases, a proper understanding of a different type of use
should be construed as requiring an actual additional physical imposition.
Next, this Part claims that the Sho-Me court should have placed greater emphasis on Henley and then contrasts Sho-Me’s easements with those in Ogg. A
policy argument against the Sho-Me court’s holding is then advanced, along
with a discussion of the implications of that holding. Finally, a proper trespass
remedy is considered, assuming a court finds trespass liability in contradiction
of the other arguments presented here.

A. A “Different Type of Use” Should Entail a Different Type of Use
with an Additional Physical Imposition
In this case, the argument that the coextensive transmission of information for commercial use, along with the admittedly allowable use for internal
communications, could possibly present an increased footprint or an unreasonably burdensome impact on the property would be baseless. The nature of light
signals carrying information within the glass strands of a fiber-optic cable for
commercial use, as opposed to internal use, clearly does not impact the underlying property in a burdensome manner. Both parties acknowledged the right-

151. See id. at 804–05 (citing Young v. Home Tel. Co., 201 S.W. 635, 636 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1918)).
152. Id. at 805. On remand for trespass damages, the jury was instructed to “award
Plaintiffs such sum as you may find from the evidence to be the fair market rental value
of Defendants’ use of the fiber optic cable on Plaintiffs’ land for commercial-telecommunications purpose from January 21, 2005[,] until February 2, 2015.” Jury Instructions at 20, Barfield, 852 F.3d 795 (No. 11CV04321), 2015 WL 1305552. The jury
awarded $129,211,337 pursuant to that instruction and an additional $1,300,000 in punitive damages. Judgment in a Civil Case, Barfield, 852 F.3d 795 (No. 11-04321-CVC-NKL), 2017 WL 3972429. However, the judgment was vacated as being against the
weight of the evidence. Order at 3, Barfield, 852 F.3d 795 (No. 888).
153. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 800–05.
154. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016) (emphasis added).
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ful placement of the cable within the easement for internal communication purposes;155 thus, the installation of the cable cannot be a source of complaint.
Therefore, the keystone of the dispute is whether use of the fiber-optic cable
for commercial telecommunications constitutes a different type of use.
Cape Girardeau is the sensible starting point of discussion for discerning
the critical question of what exactly constitutes a different type of use. Cape
Girardeau frames the point of diversion as “a commercial enterprise, distinct
from the avocation of” and “entirely dissociated” from the original grant.156
Eureka echoes this sentiment in that construction of a new line with “no connection whatever” with the original grant equated to a new burden.157 ShoMe’s commercial telecommunication use of the fiber-optic cable is not an entirely separate undertaking.
The reasoning in Cape Girardeau appears to be directly applicable in
Sho-Me’s case. The cable is “a legitimate development” when used for ShoMe’s electrical transmission purposes, but, in the language of Cape Girardeau,
“[when] serv[ing] the general public as a commercial enterprise, distinct from
the avocation of [Sho-Me’s electrical transmission], it constitutes . . . a servitude not contemplated in the original grant.”158 This conclusion necessarily
presupposes that use for commercial telecommunications cannot be “a legitimate development” for Sho-Me.159
It is imperative to note that the line of cases used as support in Cape
Girardeau involved a new physical imposition on the servient estate.160 Rich
involved a physical impact that was nevertheless approved by the court because
of its relevance to the purpose of the easement.161 Pearce involved the finding
of an additional servitude due to a dramatic expansion of telegraph/telephone
infrastructure within a railroad easement that would have affected the land in a
manner unanticipated within the grant for railroad purposes.162 The treatise
referenced in Cape Girardeau also referred to another case involving the construction of larger infrastructure than would have been needed for the original
railroad use.163 Whether an additional use is a “legitimate development” depends on whether such use was contemplated within the grant, which, in turn,
seems to depend on the impact the use imposes.

155. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 799.
156. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. v. Cape Girardeau Bell Tel. Co., 114 S.W. 586, 588

(Mo. Ct. App. 1908) (emphasis added).
157. Eureka Real Estate & Inv. Co. v. S. Real Estate & Fin. Co., 200 S.W.2d 328,
332 (Mo. 1947) (emphasis added).
158. Cape Girardeau Bell, 114 S.W. at 587–88 (original language from Cape
Girardeau Bell with insertions for Sho-Me).
159. Id. at 587.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 45–63.
161. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Rich, 19 Kan. 517, 520 (1878).
162. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Smith, 18 A. 910, 916 (Md. 1889) (consolidating ten
cases, including Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pearce).
163. JONES, supra note 48.
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In the context of a railroad, the grantor would anticipate the infrastructure
necessary for the operation of a railroad, such as tracks and telegraph lines required for support of the railroad. The infrastructure necessary for a different
use – infrastructure geared specifically to support telecommunications at a
commercial level – would require a level of infrastructure not anticipated in the
original railroad grant. For Sho-Me, no additional infrastructure was required
to support the commercial telecommunication use. The transmission occurred
within the admittedly authorized single cable. Because the underlying estate
was not burdened in any additional manner, unlike the expansion of telephone
and telegraph lines and poles in the early railroad cases, the different type of
use here should not rise to the level of being considered an expanded use.164

B. The Sho-Me Court Downplayed the Direct Relevance of Henley and
Ogg is Not Instructive
Although the court analogized Sho-Me’s situation to Carrol Electric and
dismissed its similarity to Henley,165 the context of Henley is immensely relevant. The court reasoned that Henley was not on point because Sho-Me’s easements “d[id] not indicate any intention to allow use for public-serving telecommunication purposes.”166 However, Henley more broadly requires consistency
with the principal use; the court allows “purposes not inconsistent with the
principal use granted.”167 In Henley, easements from 1922 permitting electric,
telephone, and telegraphic service, were construed to cover additional new cables and wiring for transmitting television programming.168 This broad reading
of an easement, one that takes the approach of allowing a reasonable evolution
of the use of an easement where no additional actual burden is created, is directly applicable to Sho-Me’s use of sending additional information through
the fiber-optic cable that is otherwise rightfully within the scope of the easement.
Moreover, the “dispositive issue” in Henley turned on the exclusivity of
the easements – “the exclusion of the owner and possessor of the servient tenement from participation in the rights granted.”169 The court in Henley looked
to other jurisdictions to reach the conclusion that the addition of a coaxial cable
for television added to existing electric and telephone poles without the
164. In June 2018, an addition to section 394.080.1(7) expanded the definition of
“electric transmission and distribution lines or systems” to include “cooperative-owned
or cooperative subsidiary-owned copper and fiber optic cable, facilities and technology,
or any combination thereof, that carries, or has the capacity to carry, light signals and
data beyond or in addition to the light signals and data necessary for the transmission
and distribution of electricity.” H.B. 1880, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2018).
165. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 802–03 (8th Cir. 2017).
166. Id. at 803.
167. Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 828
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 827.
169. Id. at 828.
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owner’s consent created no additional burden where the easements were exclusive and thus apportionable.170 The landowners subject to Sho-Me’s easements
cannot anticipate to use the structures installed by the REC. The landowners
cannot expect to use that portion of Sho-Me’s easement wherein the existing
electrical cables and the fiber-optic cable reside.
Although Ogg is similar to the current case in that it involves a REC and
fiber-optic cables, it is notably different because the easements acquired by the
REC in Ogg were prescriptive.171 In considering the holdings of other cases
involving easements, the characteristics of those easements and their similarities to the case at hand is of the utmost importance. Sho-Me’s electrical easements in dispute were express easements created through grants.172 Ogg’s outcome relies on the rationale that prescriptive easements should be strictly confined to their nature as developed during the prescriptive period.173 The decision in Ogg detailed the specifications of the REC’s prescriptive easement and
held that without the running of another ten-year prescriptive period, “no different or greater use could lawfully be made of that portion of the [landowner’s]
property.”174 Sho-Me’s easements should be analyzed not under the narrow
constraints of expanded use in a prescriptive easement, but rather as an express,
exclusive easement more similar to Henley.

C. Policy Implications of the Sho-Me Court’s Holding
The “expanded use” threshold for easements advanced in Missouri cases
demonstrates that developments necessary to the purpose of the easement
within the physical confines of the easement are acceptable. Thus, as in the
line of cases relying on Cape Girardeau, as in Carroll Electric, and as agreed
upon by the parties in the instant decision, it is clear that the fiber-optic cable
for internal communication purposes is rightfully within the scope of the easement.175 From a policy standpoint, requiring the REC to either renegotiate
easements or condemn the entire network of infrastructure for what amounts to
a change in capacity on a fiber-optic cable to add the external commercial telecommunication use seems an absurd result. The cost will be passed on to
users of the electricity and commercial telecommunications while the landowners, who have already been compensated for the physical space of the easement, will be compensated again.
As in Henley, where the court broadly construed the language of the easement to achieve a result in line with the original intention that would also allow
170. Id. at 828–29.
171. Ogg v. Mediacom, L.L.C., 142 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). See

discussion supra Section III.A for a comparison of the types of easements.
172. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Elec. Coop., 852 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 2017).
173. Ogg, 142 S.W.3d at 809–10.
174. Id. at 810. That use was specifically recognized by the court in Ogg to be of
one “to operate and maintain electrical power cables on poles at a height of approximately eighteen to twenty feet.” Id.
175. Barfield, 852 F.3d at 799; see discussion supra Section III.B.
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“the most economically feasible and least environmentally damaging vehicle
for installing cable systems,”176 the outcome of the present case should be addressed in an equally utilitarian manner. The disallowed “different type of use”
in section 523.283 and prior case law should be interpreted as requiring a different type of physical use of the easement. If the court in Sho-Me had interpreted the phrase “different type of use” in this manner, the case’s outcome
would have resembled the practical and non-wasteful outcome reached in Henley.177 There would be no “expanded use” and thus no trespass.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative178 is illustrative on two major points. First, the granting language of
the easement is of paramount importance. This is true from the perspective of
the landowner wanting to limit any potential undesired outcomes for a piece of
property and from the perspective of a utility contemplating the nature of potential uses for the easement. It would be revealing to know the acquisition
price that Sho-Me negotiated for those easements that fortuitously included
some reference to communications compared to those that created the dispute
in this case. In terms of considering compensation for what would be considered a perpetual easement in either case, it would be reasonable to conclude the
value demanded by the holder of the servient estate may be similar. After all,
there is no impact to the underlying property based on a change in degree alone.
Regardless, the drafter of the easement has an incentive to add inclusive language; the potential servient estate has an incentive to diligently review and
negotiate, if possible.

176. Henley v. Cont’l Cablevision of St. Louis Cty., Inc., 692 S.W.2d 825, 829
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
177. In June 2018, the Missouri legislature added section 394.085 to the chapter
concerning RECs and made the policy statement that “expanding and accelerating access to high speed broadband communications services throughout the entire state of
Missouri is necessary, desirable, [and] in the best interests of the citizens of this state .
. . .” H.B. 1880, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2018). While not “diminishing the
rights of property owners under the laws of this state,” the general assembly set forth
the following intent:
In recognition that the high capital cost of deploying fiber optics technologies
to provide broadband communications services impedes access to such services, and the rural electric cooperatives deploy fiber optics technologies for
use in the operation of their electric system infrastructure, it is the intent of the
general assembly to facilitate and to encourage rural electric cooperatives and
their affiliates, either collectively, or individually, to continue to enter into and
establish voluntary contracts or other forms of joint or cooperative agreements
for the use of rural electric cooperative infrastructure in providing access to
broadband services.

Id.
178. 852 F.3d 795.
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Second, although railroad and telegraph easement cases of a century ago
are certainly analogous to the case at hand, the disconnect between transportation of people and freight on railroad tracks and transmission of information in
telegraph and telephone lines in those cases is substantially more attenuated
than the transmission of electricity and information across outwardly similar
wires that can be situated on the same poles. The former seems to truly be a
different type of use, where the commercial communication aspect eclipses the
railroad usage by demanding greatly expanded infrastructure of a separate nature, but the latter is a much more subtle distinction. Section 523.283’s “different type of use” is a nebulous concept intended to protect landowners, but,
as discussed above, a different type of use that actually has some sort of physical impact is a justified interpretation of the concept.179

D. Measuring a Trespass Remedy Under These Circumstances
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that trespass liability is proper
through the “expanded use” analysis, the determination of whether Sho-Me’s
unauthorized use of the fiber-optic cable is a temporary or permanent trespass
will have significant consequences on the resulting damages. The trespass
should be categorized as permanent. A trespass of a permanent nature will
result in the award of a difference in the market value of the land.180 Applied
to Sho-Me’s use of the fiber-optic cable for commercial telecommunications,
the resulting change in market value would be negligible, although nominal
damages would still be applicable. The alternative – a temporary trespass –
would result in the cost of replacement and rental value until replaced.181 Applying this measure of damages to an “expanded use” trespass presents the
query of what damages exist in terms of justifying rental value in the absence
of any physical imposition.
In a case involving a trespass based on an addition of a fiber-optic cable
to a REC’s poles, in the context of cable company installing the wire on a
REC’s prescriptive easement, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western
District approved the difference between fair market value of the property before and after the trespass as “the proper measure of damages.”182 This outcome seems more in line with a traditional trespass remedy than allowing fair
market rental value of the use of the fiber-optic cable. The alternative would
be equivalent to an unjust enrichment claim – an outcome that, although possibly consistent with the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, seems to be at odds with the specified remedies mentioned in Sterbenz.183
179. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016); see discussion supra Part IV.
180. Sterbenz v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., 333 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. Ct. App.

2010).
181. Id. at 8.
182. Ogg v. Mediacom, L.L.C., 382 S.W.3d 108, 118 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
183. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 40 (AM. LAW INST. 2011), with Sterbenz, 333 S.W.3d at 7–8.
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Allowing for rental value – a value equivalent to loss of use of the cable
– seems to invite an erroneous result.184 If Sho-Me had licensed a company
vested with the power of eminent domain to add a new cable for telecommunication purposes, the result, absent landowner permission, would be a trespass
of a permanent nature and condemnation value would be appropriate.

VI. CONCLUSION
Development by utilities as a reaction to improvements in technology is
inevitable, but there must be a balance between that development and the rights
of landowners. Where an easement transects a landowner’s property, the easement holder should carefully implement changes in accordance with the grant
of the original easement. Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electric Cooperative
demonstrated how the Eighth Circuit interpreted and provided a remedy for a
nonphysical “expanded use” of an easement in Missouri.185
As developed in this case, the “different type of use” branch of the definition of “expanded use”186 encompassed a nonphysical expansion of a use that
was related to the purpose granted in the original easement language – the use
of the fiber-optic cable for internal communications was critical to the purpose
of the easement. The result is that trespass liability will apply in excessive use
cases of easements where there is no physical difference to the servient estate;
this is an outcome perhaps expanding traditional Missouri easement trespass
doctrine.
The practical result of this will currently affect few categories of easements because the class of easements where an expanded use is feasible with
no physical difference is limited. Those holding the easements impacted by
the result will face the cost of bringing the easements into compliance through
negotiations or condemnation, and the expense will likely pass to the consumer
and delay further expansion of the infrastructure. The outcome may also be
influential with the emergence of new technologies and where there is a desire
184. In June 2018, the Missouri legislature fixed this problem with an addition to
section 394.080.1(11) that states, in part:
If a property owner prevails against a rural electric cooperative or a cooperative
subsidiary in a suit in trespass or in inverse condemnation filed after August 28,
2018, the trespass shall be deemed permanent and the actual damages awarded
shall be the “fair market value” . . . . In no case filed after August 28, 2018,
may evidence of revenues or profits derived, nor the rental value of an assembled communications corridor, be admissible in determining “fair market
value.” Such actual damages shall be fixed at the time of the initial trespass,
shall not be deemed to continue, accumulate, or accrue, and upon payment of
damages the defendant shall be granted a permanent easement for the trespass
litigated.

H.B. 1880, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2018).
185. 852 F.3d 795, 802–03 (8th Cir. 2017).
186. MO. REV. STAT. § 523.283.2(2) (2016).
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to use existing easements in an efficient manner because of the practical difficulties and negative impacts of developing new corridors for similar easements.
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